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Entrepreneurship and Human Capital in Professional Sport: 1 
A Longitudinal Analysis of the Italian Soccer League 2 
ABSTRACT 3 
The discovery and deployment of human capital are overlooked topics in entrepreneurship 4 
research. Professional sport can illuminate these phenomena as sport directors take huge risks in 5 
innovating rosters. Our longitudinal analysis of the Italian Serie A investigated if sport directors 6 
with greater entrepreneurial orientations toward the acquisition of new players outperformed 7 
rivals. While soccer organizations with better roster quality and accomplished managers 8 
achieved superior rankings, the acquisition of new players had non-significant effects and was 9 
moderated negatively by accomplished managers. We argue that entrepreneurs risk with ‘too 10 
many’ talents while conformity mechanisms attenuate the entrepreneurial opportunities offered 11 
by human capital. 12 
 13 
INTRODUCTION 14 
Professional sport competitions represent a unique setting to develop entrepreneurship theory. 15 
Professional sport is indeed a hyper-competitive environment, which produces constant pressures 16 
on organizations to discover and exploit new opportunities to survive, grow and win 17 
competitions. Examples of entrepreneurial behaviors abound at different levels of analysis, from 18 
sport leagues (e.g. the growth of the National Football League in the US), to organizations (e.g. 19 
the brand expansion of European soccer clubs in China), to single individuals (e.g. the dynamic 20 
choices that team managers make during a competition). With so many examples, it is rather 21 
surprising that only few studies have looked into this sector to induce new entrepreneurship 22 
theory (Ratten, 2010; Grove & Cook, 2011; Terjesen, 2016). 23 
A distinctive feature of professional sport entrepreneurship is the centrality of human talents 24 
(Baron & Henry, 2010; Wolfe & Shepherd, 2015). In order to survive, grow and win 25 
competitions, sport organizations must be ‘one step ahead’ in the discovery, acquisition and 26 
deployment of valuable players (Crook et al., 2011; Di Minin et al., 2014). Soccer organizations, 27 
in particular, invest several millions of Euros in worldwide scouting systems to discover talents 28 
before competitors, as well as to acquire and retain them. Soccer competitions represent 29 
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entrepreneurial cycles, where soccer organizations reset their expectations every year, reassess 30 
their rosters and compete by leveraging the performance of their talents.  31 
Overall, directors in sport organizations1 often display an intense entrepreneurial orientation 32 
toward the discovery of new talents and the enrolment of high-reputation team managers to 33 
deploy players’ elusive potential. This is based on the assumptions that sport directors (i) should 34 
pursue an ambitious ‘vision of the future’ (Dimov, 2011); (ii) can best act upon this ‘vision’ by 35 
renewing human capital through new talents; and (iii) should rely on team managers’ reputation 36 
to best deploy players’ full potential. Yet, the appropriateness of these assumptions remains 37 
unknown since anecdotic evidence provides contradictory indications in this regard (Murao, 38 
2016; Wagner, 2010), while academic research has dedicated limited attention to these topics. 39 
Previous entrepreneurship research has mostly focused on how entrepreneurs discover and 40 
exploit technological and market opportunities, and how firms grow as a result of this (Covin & 41 
Miles, 1999; Wright et al., 2007). By comparison, human capital, i.e. the knowledge, skills and 42 
abilities acquired through education and experience, has never been treated as an entrepreneurial 43 
opportunity, but ‘only’ as a resource of the entrepreneur. Hence, we know that entrepreneurs 44 
with greater human capital better support firm growth (Marvel, Davis & Sproul, 2014; Rauch & 45 
Rijsdijk, 2013; Unger et al., 2011), and that the human capital of employees and managers is 46 
linked with superior performances (Crook et al., 2011). We do not know, instead, if and how 47 
entrepreneurs should orient the discovery and deployment of new talents in order to grow and 48 
reach better market positioning (Dimov, 2007; 2011). 49 
                                                          
1 A sport director is an individual working for sport organizations or with the athletic departments. The 
responsibility of sport directors include organization and administration, facility supervision, human resources, 
funding. 
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In order to address the gaps outlined above, in this paper we ask: (i) what is the relationship 50 
between the number of new talents acquired by sport organizations and their success? (ii) how 51 
do different approaches to talent acquisition affect the success of sport organizations? (iii) what 52 
is the role of team managers in moderating the relationship between the acquisition of new 53 
talents and the success of sport organizations? 54 
Building upon these premises, we looked at the experience of soccer organizations in the Italian 55 
Premier League (Serie A) in the period 1995-2013, for a total of 342 observations. Serie A 56 
organizations (e.g. Juventus FC, AC Milan, FC Inter) represent an illuminating setting for 57 
studying entrepreneurial opportunities offered by human capital. Indeed most organizations 58 
expect to win, or at least survive in the premier league, by investing large amounts of money in 59 
the discovery and acquisition of new players, and by deploying their talents through 60 
accomplished team managers. 61 
In particular, we investigated: (i) whether organizations investing in new players succeed; (ii) 62 
whether differences exist in the acquisition of new players through long-term and short-term 63 
contracts; and (iii) whether team managers with greater experience in past accomplishments 64 
positively moderate the link between the acquisition of new players and success. 65 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The next section builds the theoretical 66 
framework, first discussing the role of human capital in professional sport entrepreneurship and 67 
then developing the research hypotheses. After, we outline our research methods and present our 68 
findings. Finally, we discuss our results and derive implications for theory and practice. 69 
PROFESSIONAL SPORT ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND HUMAN CAPITAL 70 
Sport entrepreneurship is a nascent field of research, focused on how the decision-making of 71 
communities, organizations and individuals supports the survival, growth and success of sport 72 
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organizations. Sport entrepreneurship is characterized by intense and continuous proactivity, 73 
innovation and risk-taking behaviors, related to the discovery and exploitation of new markets, 74 
technologies, product opportunities and human capital (Ratten, 2010). 75 
Earlier research looked at the human capital of entrepreneurs more than the entrepreneurship of 76 
human capital. Human capital represents the knowledge, skills and abilities that individuals 77 
acquire from education and work experience (Marcel et al., 2014; Unger et al., 2011). Scholars 78 
have studied the human capital of owners, top managers, team managers and players (Baron & 79 
Henry, 2010; Fagenson-Eland, 2001). Across all these units of analysis, studies have consistently 80 
found that owners and managers with greater human capital are more likely to discover 81 
opportunities and succeed (e.g., Marvel and Lumpkin, 2007; Marvel et al., 2014; Rauch et al., 82 
2005; Unger et al., 2011). Other studies used the resource-based view to explain why 83 
organizations with greater human capital of managers and players achieve better performances. 84 
Such studies argued that valuable resources “in short supply and semi-permanently tied to the 85 
firm [deliver] above-average performance” and “knowledge embedded in human capital [is] 86 
among the most universal of resources that meet these criteria” (Crook et al., 2011; p. 444). 87 
Crook et al.’s (2011) meta-analysis found a direct and positive link between human capital and 88 
operational/financial performance (Shaw, Park & Kim, 2013; Kim & Ployhart, 2014). Wright, 89 
Smart & McMahan (1995) and Berman, Down & Hill (2002) found that sport organizations with 90 
greater human capital of their players and team managers reached superior rankings. These 91 
results suggest that the human capital of players has strategic value for the firm, thus leading 92 
sport organizations to design teams with the ‘best’ players. 93 
Less is known about the entrepreneurial value of human capital. Players’ human capital entails 94 
opportunities for new ventures. As Dimov (2011) observed: “in abstract terms, the notion of 95 
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opportunity reflects the idea that an economic system never reaches its full potential and so there 96 
is always room for actions that can take it closer to that potential” (p. 60). Hence, “an 97 
opportunity can be seen as a vision of a future in which the aspiring entrepreneur occupies a 98 
market niche, engaged in a set of market relationships that collectively constitute the business the 99 
entrepreneur intends to create” (p. 68). For soccer organizations, this vision involves the 100 
discovery and deployment of new players. Indeed, the discovery and acquisition of great talents 101 
represent the way for sport organizations to conquer a better market niche (e.g. promotion into a 102 
premier league, or qualification into international competitions), multiply the possibility of 103 
strategic choices (e.g. modelling different lineups, choosing new game-day tactics) and improve 104 
the popularity of the team (e.g. in terms of marketing revenues). Hence, sport organizations do 105 
not just enroll players to design an appropriate team, but use the discovery and acquisition of 106 
new talents to inform and implement their ‘vision of the future’. While the former reflects the 107 
human resource management function of the team manager (i.e. the “coach” and “trainee”), the 108 
latter represents the entrepreneurial function of sport directors. Sport directors are top managers 109 
– comparable to CEOs in firms in other sectors – delegated by the owners of the soccer clubs to 110 
make the key decisions about new target niches, the discovery and acquisition of new talents, as 111 
well as the identification of team managers. With owners typically focused on other core 112 
businesses, sport directors are actually the ones developing the ‘vision of the future’ and acting 113 
upon it. In English soccer, the figures of team manager and director often overlap, as the former 114 
has extensive power to develop the ‘vision’ for the organization (e.g. Ferguson for Manchester 115 
United). In our empirical context, i.e. Italian Soccer, the two figures are instead distinct as the 116 
sport director discovers and acquires players according to his ‘vision, while team managers 117 
deploy the talents. 118 
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Our study thus focuses on the entrepreneurial orientations of sport directors, who engage with 119 
the discovery and acquisition of new players through different approaches. 120 
The entrepreneurial orientation of sport directors 121 
Lumpkin and Dess (1996) defined entrepreneurial orientation as the “propensity to act 122 
autonomously, a willingness to innovate and take risks, and a tendency to be aggressive toward 123 
competitors and proactive relative to marketplace opportunities” (p. 137). The authors argued 124 
that entrepreneurial orientation should have positive and direct effects on final performance, and 125 
that this link is influenced by environmental and organizational factors. 126 
The entrepreneurial orientation of sport directors is often very high, as they are constantly on the 127 
hunt for new players. Such proactiveness and aggressiveness are underpinned by the belief that 128 
the labor market generates new opportunities every season (e.g. young new talents, players 129 
achieving maturity) and that their prompt discovery and acquisition allows greater chances to 130 
achieve new market niches. Several reasons might increase the entrepreneurial orientation of 131 
sport directors toward new players. 132 
First, players play a central role in the ‘vision of a better future’ and the discovery of new players 133 
represents the most direct way for sport directors to influence performance. Other types of firms 134 
can pursue different opportunities – e.g. new technologies, supply-chain configurations, 135 
customer services, products and organizational structures (Shane, 2003). These are not available 136 
to sport directors, who (i) cannot act upon tournament rules, technologies, and product 137 
configurations (as these are controlled by the league commissioners), and (ii) are not motivated 138 
to act upon other elements (e.g. customer services) which are less relevant for the ‘vision’ of a 139 
better market niche. 140 
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Second, sport contexts are inherently competitive and dynamic, so that opportunities constantly 141 
change. Expectations are reset at the beginning of each new season, and the competitive 142 
advantage acquired in the past is almost irrelevant, as the organizations must ‘play the game’ 143 
from scratch. So, entrepreneurs may feel the need to proactively and aggressively discover new 144 
players to achieve the desired ‘vision’, while inertia might reduce the capacity to reach ‘full 145 
potential’. Furthermore, sport entrepreneurs may acquire new players ‘tactically’ to put pressure 146 
on their rivals, i.e. remove potential opportunities that others might deploy to win the 147 
competition (Dietl et al., 2008). Third, there is extensive evidence of path-breaking decisions in 148 
sport environments as rivals constantly try to emulate or defeat each other’s practices (Di Minin 149 
et al., 2014). Therefore, sport directors must proactively look into new opportunities to generate 150 
competitive advantages, by breaking existing paths and finding new ones. 151 
There are also two environmental factors that may influence the perceived risks of high 152 
entrepreneurial orientation. On the one hand, soccer organizations face the risk of not acting 153 
entrepreneurially. Soccer organizations face strong expectations from media and fans to acquire 154 
new players. External pressures are channeled by social media, TV and radio programs, 155 
specialized websites, and even protests and flash mobs; these can be so intense that several 156 
owners and top managers have been replaced because of them (Gerrard, 2000; Park, Mahony & 157 
Kim, 2011). On the other hand, sport directors may perceive limited risk in the deployment of 158 
new players. Advanced forms of socialization tactics are indeed implemented to adjust new 159 
players and team managers in the organization. Soccer organizations, for instance, organize 160 
extensive training camps where players get physically fit, prepare tactics and improve their 161 
technical skills, as well as shape the sense of community amongst players and the mutual 162 
integration of newcomers with the ‘old guard’ (Benson, Evans & Eys, 2016). 163 
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In conclusion, whether intense entrepreneurial orientation in the discovery and acquisition of 164 
human capital actually yields superior performances remains unknown and represents the core 165 
contribution of our article. 166 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 167 
In this section, we present our hypotheses by first discussing the expectations and practices from 168 
the field, and then the theoretical arguments from earlier research. 169 
Discovery and acquisition of human capital: number and contracts of new players 170 
Several organizations invest a lot of money on new players regardless of their most recent 171 
accomplishments (Deloitte, 2016). Four reasons may suggest why the acquisition of new players 172 
should yield superior performances. First, soccer organizations might suppose that the value of a 173 
roster decreases as a result of age, injuries and slackening. Hence, inertia might result in weaker 174 
performances. Conversely, the transfer market provides a constant inflow of new talents, 175 
emerging from youth systems and international leagues. Second, the acquisition of new players 176 
‘steals’ talents from competitors. Soccer organizations often try to ‘kill’ the most immediate 177 
competition by acquiring their best talents or complicating their transfer plans. Third, the 178 
acquisition of new players may generate constant alertness among established players. The 179 
constant ‘threat’ of being replaced reduces the risks of complacency among the ‘old guard’. 180 
Finally, pressure from media and fans is increasing thanks to the diffusion of broadcasting 181 
coverage, analytics & statistics, and social media; by satisfying their ‘hunger’ for new players, 182 
sport organizations may receive greater support from fans and media, which helps players 183 
perform appropriately during matches. 184 
The acquisition of new players may however not have linearly positive effects on performance. 185 
Indeed, ‘too many’ players in the same position might disrupt decision-making. Team managers 186 
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may struggle to put top players ‘on the bench’, so they introduce compromising solutions (e.g. 187 
team rotations) that ultimately inhibit team synergies and thwart the quality of performance. 188 
Second, ‘too much’ internal competition increases the possibility of internal rifts between 189 
players, especially when they compete for the same spot; resentment toward team managers who 190 
make decisions on playing time; and faultlines between the ‘old guard’ and new players. Finally, 191 
organizations often face resource constraints and cannot invest in new players without divesting 192 
others. The impact of new players might be attenuated by ‘sacrifices’ made elsewhere. 193 
These expectations resonate with earlier theory on the effects of newcomers in organizations 194 
(Forbes et al., 2006; Rink & Ellemers, 2009; Rink et al., 2013). On the upside, newcomers 195 
provide new knowledge, competences and skills, which add to or complement the human capital 196 
already available in an organization (Bauer et al., 2007; Mathieu et al., 2014; Rink et al., 2013). 197 
Newcomers also provide new perspectives and approaches that reduce the complacency of the 198 
‘old guard’ (i.e. old-timers). They inject ‘new blood’ into the organization and their new ideas, 199 
perspectives and approaches can challenge the status quo and spur more radical forms of 200 
innovation (Perretti & Negro, 2007). On the downside, newcomers may disrupt internal stability 201 
(Mathieu et al., 2014; Rink et al., 2013). Old-timers may perceive newcomers as a threat to their 202 
values, interests and practices, and may not accept them as legitimate coworkers and often do not 203 
socialize newcomers. In these circumstances, the organization struggles to perform appropriately 204 
(Bauer et al., 2007; Ferriani et al., 2009; Forbes et al., 2006). Likewise, newcomers may refuse to 205 
socialize with old-timers and enact threats to established values, interests and practices (Rink et 206 
al., 2013). Newcomers may decide not to actively seek information on the work context or 207 
engage in social relationships to increase role clarity and task coordination (Bauer et al., 2007; 208 
Beus et al., 2014). When old-timers’ receptivity is low or newcomers do not actively try to be 209 
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involved, negative effects may become predominant, since newcomer entry stymies internal 210 
team cohesion, viability and transactive memory (Rink et al., 2013). Combining these arguments, 211 
some recent study tested a curvilinear hypothesis between newcomers’ entry and organizational 212 
performance (Ferriani et al., 2009; Ramos-Villagrasa et al., 2012). Following these 213 
considerations, we thus hypothesize that: 214 
H1: The number of new players acquired by a soccer organization has curvilinear (inverted-U 215 
shaped) effects on its championship ranking. 216 
Soccer organizations acquire new players through long-term contracts or short-term loans (one 217 
year or less). Organizations overwhelmingly privilege the first option to loans. Long-term 218 
contracts provide organizations with control over a player’s tenure as they (i) legally become 219 
first movers in contract extensions (competitors cannot approach the player until six months 220 
away from contract expiry date); (ii) decide where and how the player could move during the 221 
contract duration, usually avoiding direct competitors and receiving money in return. The 222 
acquired player thus ‘belongs’ to the organization and is indefinitely removed from competitors. 223 
Instead, loaned players help the organization ‘only’ during the single season, after which they 224 
move back to the original employer. 225 
These behaviors resonate with theory on newcomers’ receptivity (Rink et al., 2013), according to 226 
which newcomers with short-term and long-term contracts adjust differently to the organization. 227 
Old-timers are more likely to invest time, resources and personal engagement in socializing long-228 
term newcomers – and vice versa. Both have reasonable expectations to interact for a long time, 229 
so they are more motivated to act collaboratively. Long-term newcomers, in particular, are more 230 
motivated to behave in accordance with existing rules and practices than short-term newcomers 231 
(Rink & Ellemers, 2009). Having fewer expectations and intentions to remain, short-term 232 
newcomers are instead more detached from the rules and practices of old-timers, and express 233 
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their personal identities more freely (Rink et al., 2013). Employees with expectations of short-234 
term contract are likely to pursue ‘careerism’ and rely on transactional rather than psychological 235 
contracts to engage with coworkers (De Cuyper et al., 2008). Thus, they might hoard their 236 
unique skills and knowledge and act on a ‘hidden profile’ (Stasser & Titus, 2003), or enact an 237 
oppositional identity to spur radical changes in the status quo (Rink et al., 2013). Combining 238 
these insights, we thus hypothesize that: 239 
H2: The acquisition of new players by a soccer organization through long-term contracts has 240 
more positive effects on its championship ranking than the acquisition of new players through 241 
short-term loans. 242 
Deployment of players’ human capital: the role of team managers 243 
We now focus on the role of team managers in the deployment of players’ human capital. Earlier 244 
research highlighted the role of line managers as corporate entrepreneurs during the deployment 245 
of opportunities (Kuratko et al., 2005). Particularly, team managers supervise the socialization 246 
and performances of players (Zhang, 2017), but they also act as micro-entrepreneurs who 247 
discover and deploy real-time opportunities during matches and tournaments (Frick et al., 2006; 248 
Wolfe & Shepherd, 2015). So, they are expected to have a direct effect on performance, as well 249 
as moderate the impact of new players on performance. 250 
Soccer organizations give extensive authority to team managers, who control how players adjust 251 
in the new organization, define the conditioning tactics (e.g. workouts) to put players in physical 252 
shape, and organize strategic meetings to instruct game plans. Hence, the discovery of 253 
‘appropriate’ team managers is important to fulfil the ‘vision’ of the sport directors. Earlier 254 
research generally agrees that entrepreneurs and top managers with higher human capital (in 255 
terms of education, experience and task-related skills) are more likely to achieve firm survival 256 
and growth (Marvel et al., 2014). Yet, soccer organizations tend to select team managers 257 
according to their reputation – measured primarily by their previous accomplishments – rather 258 
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than their human capital. Real Madrid, for instance, traditionally selects team managers with the 259 
most accomplishments in the recent past. The enrolment of José Mourinho, Fabio Capello and 260 
Carlo Ancelotti reflects an assumption that who ‘won the most’ is also ‘the best’ in the market. 261 
Other organizations discard the idea that the number of past accomplishments is a valid proxy of 262 
managers’ human capital. AC Milan and FC Barcelona, for instance, take more risks in 263 
discovering young team managers (e.g. Arrigo Sacchi and Josep Guardiola). 264 
Past research suggests that individuals’ reputation may be a safe proxy for human capital. 265 
Previous experiences of success may enrich an individual’s human capital, as they affirm what 266 
operational knowledge, emotional intelligence and heuristics are appropriate to navigate new 267 
entrepreneurial endeavors (Wolfe and Shepher, 2015). Successful individuals are more confident 268 
as well as more informed of ‘what it takes’ to win. They can also be more assertive, using their 269 
past victories to legitimize their decision-making. So, subordinates are more likely to respect 270 
them and follow the instruction during complex situations (Dirks, 2000; West et al., 2003). 271 
Combining these insights, we hypothesize that: 272 
H3: Soccer organizations with greater team managers’ experience in past accomplishments have 273 
higher championship ranking. 274 
The above arguments also apply when we look at the role of team managers in socializing new 275 
players, and in trying to ‘extract’ the best value from them. Team managers can do so by 276 
clarifying sources and information on relevant tasks, boundaries and authorities, designing work 277 
and instructions that orient, engage and energize the worker, developing norms of conduct, 278 
information systems, incentives and sanctions, and coaching workers to use their individual skills 279 
and collective resources (Ashforth et al., 2007; Bauer et al., 2007). Managers with greater 280 
reputation might enact these tasks more effectively because their greater experience, skills and 281 
knowledge help them understanding the identities, frames and meanings of their workers, 282 
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recognizing the faultiness separating old-timers and newcomers, and increasing their capacity to 283 
prevent/moderate conflicts (Hitt et al., 2001). Managers with greater reputation also have greater 284 
‘referent power’, i.e., more ability to increase others’ feelings of obligation and responsibility 285 
towards the organization and consider the manager/leader as a role model (Zinko et al., 2007). A 286 
distinction can be made between new players with short-term and long-term contracts. Short-287 
term newcomers may be relatively immune to managers’ referent power, as they rely on 288 
transactional rather than psychological contracts with their managers (De Cuyper et al., 2008). 289 
Thus, short-term newcomers might be more likely to develop more independent and personal 290 
decisions/behaviors (Rink & Ellemers, 2009). Conversely, long-term newcomers may identify 291 
with the organization, and conform to the referent power of their supervisors (Zinko et al., 2012). 292 
Taken together, these considerations lead us to hypothesize that: 293 
H4: Team managers with higher experience in past accomplishments moderate positively the 294 
effects of new players on championship rankings, i.e. the acquisition of new players has a more 295 
positive effective on championship rankings when team managers’ experience in past 296 
accomplishments is higher. 297 
H5: Team managers with higher experience in past accomplishments more positively moderate 298 
the effects of new players acquired through long-term contracts on championship rankings than 299 
the effects of new players acquired through short-term loans on championship rankings. 300 
METHODS AND MEASURES 301 
Empirical Setting 302 
These hypotheses are tested in the context of the Italian Serie A. This professional league has 303 
developed into a remunerative industry with total revenues exceeding €2.2 billion per year and 304 
spread among its 20 clubs. These revenues come from match-day tickets, broadcasting rights, 305 
commercial agreements and player trades (FIGC, 2016). Yet, the costs exceed €2.5 billion per 306 
year, with 50% of the costs associated with player salaries and trades (FIGC, 2016). The 307 
survival, growth, and success of Serie A organizations can be measured in two different ways. 308 
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On the one hand, their survival, growth and success in the Serie A competition derive from the 309 
capacity of their players to avoid relegation, growth can be measured by improvements in table 310 
positions over the years and success is linked with final victories or, at least, clinching spots for 311 
international competitions. Differently, the survival, growth and success in Serie A businesses, 312 
like other entertainment sectors, depend on the capacity to generate profits, or at least sustainable 313 
losses (FIGC, 2016). The two dynamics are connected with each other, since cash-flows grow or 314 
decline according to club results (Deloitte, 2016). Most noticeably, relegated organizations 315 
cannot access the main broadcasting rights (which represent around 60% of the total revenues). 316 
The two dynamics do not strictly depend on each other, though, as successful soccer clubs might 317 
fail due to ownership problems (e.g. Fiorentina in 2002). We will focus on the sport 318 
performances in Serie A competitions, as this is where players’ and team managers’ human 319 
capital produce the most direct effects. 320 
Serie A organizations acquire players in an open transfer market characterized by the progressive 321 
elimination of isolating mechanisms. Serie A adopted the broader EU legislation regarding the 322 
free circulation of communitarian workers. The Bosman ruling in 1995 banned restrictions on the 323 
mobility of EU players in EU leagues. Previously, Serie A organizations could acquire a fixed 324 
number of foreign players, which thwarted the number of transactions inside and outside Italy. 325 
FIFA regulations also stipulate that player contracts can have a maximum length of five years 326 
(during and after which they must be renegotiated). Formally, no organization can negotiate 327 
contracts with players owned by other teams, until six months before the expiry date. Infractions 328 
are sanctioned with penalizations and bans. Nevertheless, on several occasions, players move 329 
during their tenure with transfer fees paid by the acquiring club to the former employer. Unlike 330 
most industries, soccer organizations trade players for an amount of money that reflects the 331 
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buying club’s perception of the player’s value. Transfer fees vary considerably, but often exceed 332 
the millions of Euros (the record is currently Gonzalo Higuain’s transfer to FC Juventus for 333 
€90M in 2016). Similarly, player contracts are highly remunerative (the highest salary is 334 
currently earned by Higuain with €7.5M per year). No salary cap regulates payrolls. 335 
All Serie A organizations have institutionalized scouting systems to discover and acquire new 336 
players, as well as training systems and socialization tactics to deploy their talents. Serie A 337 
organizations have a network of scouts, covering the main leagues in Europe, South America, 338 
and Africa. Extensive information about players is often available even to fans and media, e.g. 339 
with databases such as Transfermarkt, providing ‘raw data’ on the history and stats of players,  340 
and popular applications such as Football Manager that provides analyses of skills and potential. 341 
While data have become more accessible, the assessment of players’ talent has not become 342 
easier. Investments in human capital are a source of financial risk for the organization, since poor 343 
player performances generate the need for new expenditure to acquire substitutes, and potentially 344 
significant capital losses if the organizations fail to trade the player or trade him at a lower price. 345 
Serie A Competition 346 
Serie A competition is currently fourth in UEFA rankings and hosts four (Juventus, AC Milan, 347 
AS Roma and Inter Milan) of the 20 clubs with the highest revenues in Europe (Deloitte, 2016). 348 
In 2013/14, total Serie A revenues amounted to almost $2 billion from broadcasting, match-day 349 
tickets and merchandise. Serie A follows a true round-robin format from late August to early 350 
June. The 20 teams play against each other twice for a total 38 matches. Teams can use lineups 351 
with 11 players with three substitutions and are awarded three points for each win, one for a 352 
draw and none for a loss. The team with most points wins the Scudetto (i.e., championship). The 353 
top three teams in Serie A qualify for the UEFA Champions League, teams finishing 4th to 6th 354 
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qualify for the UEFA Europa League, the three lowest placed teams ‘exit the market’ and are 355 
relegated to Serie B (i.e., second division). Higher ranking position engenders superior revenues 356 
as Serie A winners, Champions League and Europa League qualifiers receive financial bonuses. 357 
The acquisition of new players occurs in two ‘transfer windows’ (June-August and January). In 358 
the 2015/16 season, the value of these transactions amounted to almost $800 million. 359 
The data to test our hypotheses were extracted from www.transfermarkt.com, covering the Serie 360 
A seasons from 1995-1996 to 2012-2013, i.e., after the Bosman ruling liberalized the transfer of 361 
players in the European Union. Transfermarkt is a German-based website that collects and 362 
provides football information including scores, results, transfer news and player values, and 363 
reports detailed information on several championships: 49 A-Leagues, 35 B-Leagues and 57 364 
National Trophy Competitions in Europe. Transfermarkt provides detailed and longitudinal data 365 
on individual players and coaches (e.g., age, nationality, career, transfers, awards, personal 366 
performance) and includes daily updates on their careers, histories and transfers (with details on 367 
the nature of moves, e.g., loan or full transfer). Finally, it contains information on team 368 
performance in terms of match scores, rankings and several details on the organization (e.g., 369 
stadium capacity, achievements, roster size, links to team websites). 370 
Dependent Variable 371 
Our dependent variable TableRanking measures competitive performance with the ranking of 372 
each organization at the end of the season, ranging from 1 (best performance) to 20 (lowest 373 
performance)2. This measure describes the final position achieved by each team at the end of the 374 
season, resulting in different national honors and financial rewards (Brannick, Salas, & Prince, 375 
1997). The final ranking in the championship represents the performance for which the players’ 376 
                                                          
2 To explain the results more straightforwardly, we measured our dependent variable in the range from -1 to -20. 
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human capital is primarily responsible and is a key indicator of the soccer organization’s success 377 
and market attractiveness (Koenigstorfer, Groeppel-Klein, & Kunkel, 2010). 378 
We do not implement a commercial/financial performance measure as one of our dependent 379 
variables because, as noted, the role of players’ human capital is indirect and moderated by a 380 
number of factors outside of their control. Notably: (i) a large portion of broadcasting-related 381 
revenue depends on the team’s catchment area, irrespective of actual performance in the season 382 
(e.g., organizations in Rome, Milan, Turin and Naples tend to have more money than others 383 
because they have more fans and thus more potential TV customers); (ii) large commercial 384 
revenues depend on negotiations with sponsors, which are managed by other departments/units 385 
in the organization (Deloitte, 2016). Therefore, revenues do not immediately reflect the ‘success’ 386 
of the organization, but a combination of loosely linked factors. Finally, our dependent variable 387 
is temporally lagged (one year) respect to the independent variables, hence avoiding issues about 388 
the direction of causality. Teams also tend to hire new players during two transfer periods, i.e. a 389 
‘summer session’ and a ‘winter session’; this further reduces problems about reverse causality. 390 
Independent Variables 391 
Related to H1, we use the NewPlayers measure to represent the number of newcomers that an 392 
organization acquires each season. As all teams are of a comparable size, relative measures of 393 
newcomer entry are considered redundant (Ferriani et al., 2009). In a separate analysis, to 394 
address H2, we differentiate between the AcquiredPlayers variable, calculated as the number of 395 
new players acquired through multi-year deals, and the LoanedPlayers variable, calculated as the 396 
number of new players acquired on loan. In both the ‘summer’ and ‘winter’ sessions of players 397 
transfer organizations can acquire long- and short-term newcomers. 398 
18 
 
Related to H3 and H4, we use the TeamManagerAccomplishments measure to describe the 399 
human capital of team managers. We adopt an objective measure that considers the past 400 
accomplishments of the individuals rather than external assessments by the media, peers, 401 
managers and/or players as well as manager self-assessments. This approach is based on the 402 
definition of reputation as “a perceptual identity formed from the collective perceptions of 403 
others, which is reflective of the complex combination of salient personal characteristics and 404 
accomplishments, demonstrated behavior, and intended images” (Zinko et al., 2007, p. 165). The 405 
variable is specifically evaluated as the total number of competitions won by the head coach 406 
including Italian (e.g., Serie A, Coppa Italia), European (e.g., Champions League and Europa 407 
League) and international (e.g., World Cup) competitions. 408 
Control Variables 409 
We control for other factors that may influence table rankings. First, RosterQuality controls for 410 
the soccer team’s overall human capital. Unlike firms in most other sectors, soccer organizations 411 
trade individual players for a fixed amount of money, which is then recorded in financial 412 
statements as a capital asset (along with amortization). Although theoretically a perfect 413 
opportunity to develop a market-based value of players’ human capital: (i) few organizations 414 
report data on players’ values in their financial statement; (ii) when available, these may relate to 415 
their actual technical value in a rather spurious way (Risaliti & Verona, 2013). Likewise, 416 
quantifying players’ human capital through their contracts is problematic as this variable 417 
artificially represents the actual human capital of players (e.g., players may earn a great deal 418 
more than colleagues in another club not because of their higher productivity, but because of 419 
their employer’s bargaining power). More than theoretically questionable, data on players’ 420 
market value do not cover all seasons under investigation (only available from the 2005/2006 421 
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season). Accordingly, we implement a variable that recognizes the technical value of players. 422 
Specifically, players are reviewed and signed up by national head coaches, who act as external 423 
and independent observers. We thus adopt the total number of matches played in the national 424 
squads as a suitable proxy of players’ human capital (Cattani & Ferriani, 2008). 425 
Second, OrganizationalProximity controls for the effect exerted by team members’ familiarity on 426 
interaction ease, information and knowledge exchange (Boschma, 2005; Cattani et al., 2013). 427 
This variable is measured by the average number of seasons each player was on a given team. 428 
Third, we include proximity measures that reflect the existence of demographic and work-related 429 
fault-lines across members that could enable or endanger performance (Lau & Murnighan, 430 
1998). The CulturalProximity measure reflects the average cultural proximity between players’ 431 
birthplaces. We employ Kogut and Singh’s (1988) measure based on Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) 432 
four cultural dimensions. This index is largely adopted to account for cultural differences 433 
(Capaldo & Messeni Petruzzelli, 2011; Lavie & Miller, 2008) and is measured as: 434 
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where baCD   is the cultural distance between the countries of birth of players a and b; Iib and Iia 436 
are the scores for the ith cultural dimension and countries of players a and b, Vi is the variance of 437 
the ith cultural dimension. The scores for each country on the four dimensions derive from 438 
http://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_dimensions.php. Cultural proximity is thus calculated 439 
as the inverse of the above measure for each pair of players and then averaged per team. 440 
Fourth, we control for different properties in team composition, namely, size (RosterSize) 441 
measured by the total number of players on the team in each season, and age (RosterAge) 442 
measured by averaging the players’ age in each season (Mathieu et al., 2014; Stewart, 2006). 443 
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Fifth, we control for variables that reflect the financial performance and reputational ‘weight’ of 444 
soccer organizations. Serie A competition (as most other soccer competitions) is characterized by 445 
a relatively small group of top clubs that compete for final victory, while others traditionally 446 
compete for lower ranks. Hence, we include a proxy for organizational reputation 447 
(OrganizationalReputation) measured by the total number of previous seasons won by the team 448 
in Serie A. To account for financial results, we then include a proxy of the organization’s 449 
bargaining power through the NetTransfer variable measured as the difference between the 450 
money received from selling players and the money spent for acquiring players. We emphasize 451 
that we intend to measure the bargaining power actually used in the competition season rather 452 
than a more theoretical definition of entrepreneurs’ available finances. Indeed, in several cases, 453 
club owners have seasons/periods in which they hold back from investing money in soccer clubs 454 
and hence have lower expectations regarding final performance. In addition, we include a proxy 455 
of the organization’s catchment area with the StadiumSeats variable measured as the overall size 456 
of the team’s local stadium. 457 
Finally, we control for the presence of penalization points (Penalization), which can affect the 458 
championship ranking. In this regard, we introduce a dummy variable whose value is equal to 1 459 
if the team has been penalized for administrative or other unfair behaviors. 460 
Data analysis 461 
Our dataset is an unbalanced panel with 342 observations. To test our hypotheses, we use panel 462 
negative binomial regression models. Our dependent variable is a count and integer variable, 463 
rendering linear regression modeling inadequate as the distribution of residuals will be 464 
heteroskedastic non-normal. Additionally, the dependent variable does not meet the condition of 465 
having a mean equal to standard deviation, violating the Poisson assumption. We hence consider 466 
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the negative binomial estimation to be more suitable to analyze our data as this allows the 467 
variance to differ from the mean (Hausman, Hall, & Griliches, 1984). Moreover, we adopt the 468 
random-effects rather than the fixed-effects specification according to the Hausman test results. 469 
We estimate the models using the ‘xtnbreg’ routine included in the STATA 12.0 software 470 
package. The potential multicollinearity tests indicate that the maximum variance inflation factor 471 
index is below the critical value of 10 (Kleinbaum et al., 1998), thus eliminating any concerns. 472 
RESULTS 473 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics in terms of means, standard deviations and correlations. 474 
The correlation values between the independent variables fall below the 0.70 threshold, 475 
indicating acceptable discriminant validity (Cohen et al., 2003). Finally, we included variance 476 
inflation factor index in the analysis. The maximum value (2.361) does not exceed the critical 477 
value of 10 (Kleinbaum et al., 1998), hence indicating no multi-collinearity issues. Furthermore, 478 
we performed the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for endogeneity (Davidson & MacKinnon, 1993). 479 
Specifically, we introduced TeamMarketValue as instrumental variable, represented by the total 480 
economic value of team players. Results avoided endogeneity issues. 481 
“Insert Table 1 about here” 482 
Table 2 presents the results of the regression analyses. Model 1 only includes the effects of the 483 
control variables on team performance, Model 2 the effects of NewPlayers and Model 3 the 484 
quadratic effects of NewPlayers. 485 
“Insert Table 2 about here” 486 
In line with H2, we consider only the linear effects of both AcquiredPlayers and LoanedPlayers. 487 
However, when including the squared terms, these are insignificant, thus supporting our initial 488 
assumption. Model 4 includes the distinct effects of LoanedPlayers and AcquiredPlayers while 489 
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Models 5 and 6 report the contingency effects of TeamManagerAccomplishments on 490 
NewPlayers, LoanedPlayers and AcquiredPlayers respectively. Lower values of TableRanking 491 
indicate better relative competitive performance while a negative coefficient indicates a positive 492 
effect (and vice versa). 493 
Regarding the control variables, Model 1 shows that both RosterSize (β = -0.033, p <0.001) and 494 
RosterAge (β = -0.050, p <0.05) exert a negative effect on team performance, signaling that a 495 
large number of members may entail excessive coordination costs (Cohen et al., 1996), which 496 
may in turn hamper the competitive results, while old members may reduce the team’s capability 497 
to respond to new stimuli and extensive workloads (Timmerman, 2000). However, the latter 498 
appears unstable, as shown for instance in Model 6 (β = -0.034, p <0.1). In line with existing 499 
literature (e.g., Ertug & Castellucci, 2012), OrganizationalReputation (β = 0.032, p <0.001) 500 
exerts a positive effect on TableRanking along with StadiumSeats (β = 9.06e-6, p <0.001). By 501 
contrast, NetTransfer consistently exerts a non-significant effect across the models (β = -0.002, p 502 
<0.1) along with the two proximity measures CulturalProximity (β = -0.215, p >0.1) and 503 
OrganizationalProximity (β = 0.054, p >0.1). Regarding the role of human capital, we first 504 
observe that the control variable RosterQuality, representing the team’s overall human capital, 505 
exerts a positive effect throughout the models (β = 0.025, p <0.01). This emphasizes that 506 
increases in players’ human capital translates into superior TableRanking. 507 
Regarding the specific role of new players, Models 2 and 3 show that NewPlayers has a 508 
significant linear and negative effect on TableRanking (β = -0.041, p <0.05 in Model 3). This 509 
negative effect disappears with the moderation of TeamManagerAccomplishments in Model 5 510 
and, more importantly, splits into two when recognizing the difference between short-term and 511 
long-term newcomers in Model 6. Specifically, LoanedPlayers is negatively related to 512 
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TableRanking (β = -0.021, p <0.05) and AcquiredPlayers is not associated with any significant 513 
effect. These results do not support H1, which assumes a quadratic (inverted-U shape) 514 
relationship between new players and championship ranking, yet interestingly support H2 in 515 
showing that the effect of loans is more negative than long-term acquisitions. This means that 516 
Serie A organizations (i) do not achieve negative or positive effects when they acquire new 517 
players; and (ii) might need to expect weaker growth when they invest in loans. 518 
Regarding the role of head coaches’ human capital, Model 6 shows that 519 
TeamManagerAccomplishments is positively related to TableRanking (β = 0.040, p <0.05), thus 520 
supporting H3. However, TeamManagerAccomplishments negatively moderates the effect of 521 
NewPlayers (β = -0.004, p <0.01); the empirical results does not support H4. The moderation is 522 
negative also for both LoanedPlayers (β = -0.009, p <0.05) and AcquiredPlayers (β = -0.004, p 523 
<0.05); the empirical results support H5 in showing that the moderation is more negative for 524 
loaned players than acquired ones. This means that Serie A organizations (i) achieve superior 525 
growth when they rely on team managers with more experiences of previous success (as this 526 
arguably approximates their skills and knowledge), but (ii) might need to expect a weaker impact 527 
of new players under managers with more experiences of previous success. To test the 528 
robustness of our findings, we operationalize the dependent variable differently. Using the 529 
measure that Szymanski and Smith (1997) suggest, we also operationalize team performance as: 530 
𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 = ln (
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠𝑡 + 1 − 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
) 533 
where CompetingTeamst is the number of teams competing in Serie A in season t and TeamRankit 531 
is the ranking of team i in season t. Adopting this measurement confirmed our overall results. 532 
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DISCUSSION 534 
Previous entrepreneurship research has studied the human capital of entrepreneurs, arguing that 535 
individuals with more knowledge, skills and abilities make ‘better’ decisions regarding firm 536 
survival and growth (Marvel et al., 2014; Rauch & Rijsdijk, 2013; Unger et al., 2011). Our 537 
understanding of the entrepreneurship of human capital remains instead vague. To address this 538 
gap, we focused on how entrepreneurial orientations linked with the discovery and deployment 539 
of new talents influence performance. Previous studies found that a greater ‘stock’ of human 540 
capital supports superior performances (Crook et al., 2011). In this paper we looked at the ‘flow’ 541 
of new talents to investigate if organizations with more proactive, risk-taking, innovative and 542 
aggressive orientations outperform rivals (with comparable human capital). If so, organizations 543 
should not just focus on resource configuration, but also on its constant renewal. The 544 
professional sport sector represented an ideal setting to generate theory on this topic. Players’ 545 
human capital represents the key opportunity acted upon by sport directors to achieve new 546 
market niches. Like CEOs in firms, sport directors are delegated by owners to develop and act 547 
upon the ‘vision of the future’ for the soccer club. With decisions on new technologies, 548 
structures and rules out of their control, the entrepreneurial orientation of sport directors manifest 549 
itself in the discovery of new talents, and in the selection of team managers for their deployment. 550 
Based on our results, we provide three main insights. 551 
First, we suggest that entrepreneurs do not risk with ‘too much” human capital, but risk with ‘too 552 
many’ talents. The survival and growth of soccer organizations appears relatively indifferent to 553 
the composition of talents: the number of new players (differently from Hypothesis 1), cultural 554 
and organizational proximity of players are not correlated to championship ranking. Rather, the 555 
linearly positive relationship between roster quality and table ranking suggests that - as far as the 556 
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overall quality of human capital increases – organizations can expect greater chances of survival 557 
and growth. This resonates with Crook et al. (2011), arguing that superior human capital 558 
generates superior competitive advantages. A resource-based view might suggest that players’ 559 
human capital is a unique asset that yields competitive advantages. Conversely, organizations 560 
which accumulate ‘too many’ talents reduce their capability to survive, grow and succeed. The 561 
negative relationship between team size and rankings can be explained in two ways, i.e. (i) larger 562 
groups of talents are more likely to enter into interpersonal conflicts as they compete for a 563 
limited and non-negotiable amount of roster spots; and (ii) the decision-making of team 564 
managers is complicated by the existence of ‘too many’ options. 565 
Second, our study looked into the discovery and acquisition of new talents as the expression of 566 
the entrepreneurial orientation of sport directors. The hypothesis of curvilinear relations between 567 
roster acquisitions and final ranking was not supported, as the number of new talents had no 568 
significant impact. To interpret this result, we suggest that certain initiatives neutralized the risks 569 
and opportunities attached to the discovery and deployment of new talents. Specifically, new 570 
talents brought along opportunities of variety, i.e. differences in expertise, functional background 571 
and experiences, and the risks of separation, i.e. differences in beliefs, values and cultures 572 
(Harrison and Klein, 2007). Variety increases creativity and performances, as individuals possess 573 
non-redundant knowledge and decision-making becomes more flexible; separation decreases 574 
performances, as individuals engage with interpersonal conflicts and are less cohesive. 575 
Opportunities of variety are balanced with the risks of separation or, as we suspect, both are 576 
lessened by institutional and organizational factors. The role of socialization tactics is especially 577 
intriguing. Our model did not include variables on socialization tactics, as they are common 578 
practice across all Serie A teams. Indeed, all teams engage with induction events, training camps, 579 
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weekly trainings and match-day preparations, which are meant to adjust new players with the 580 
‘old guard’ and curtail the risks of different values and cultures (Ashforth et al., 2007; Bauer et 581 
al., 2007). Arguably, these tactics generate compliance to top-down sets of rules and role 582 
assignments that they cushion the positive effects of individual creativity and productivity. This 583 
resonates with theories of conformity and cognitive lock-in in organizational behavior studies 584 
(Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000), according to which individuals in new social contexts pursue 585 
stability and acceptance from the ‘old guard’ as their primary objective (Cable et al., 2013).  586 
In partial revision to this, the empirical results about Hypothesis 2 suggest that the acquisition of 587 
new players through short-term loans can introduce additional risks. To interpret this result, we 588 
take inspiration from earlier organizational behavior research, according to which newcomers 589 
have lower motivations to integrate with old-timers when they expect to leave the organization 590 
soon; and similarly old-timers have fewer motivations to integrate them into the team (Rink et 591 
al., 2013). The separation of values, beliefs and cultures is accentuated by the different affiliation 592 
of players, as the old guard and the acquired new players both ‘belong’ to the organization, while 593 
the loaned new players belong to other employers. When this happens, loaned players (i.e. 594 
employees with short-term contracts) are likely to focus on the transactional rather than 595 
psychological aspects of their contracts, hence optimizing their individual performance and their 596 
visibility regardless of collective goals (Rousseau, 1990).  597 
Third, the number of past accomplishments is a good proxy to measure the capacity of team 598 
managers to exploit the human capital of the roster. Yet, accomplished managers introduced 599 
peculiar risks in the exploitation of new players. On the upside, we find evidence that 600 
organizations with more accomplished team managers achieved superior table rankings (as 601 
expected by Hypothesis 3). We interpret this result along with prior research on the effect of past 602 
27 
 
successes on entrepreneurial skills. Indeed, past accomplishments not only represent a proxy of 603 
discovery/exploitation skills, but also represent events that (i) energize and inform the decision-604 
making of individuals and (ii) increase their referent power toward players (Zinko et al., 2012). 605 
On the downside, we found a negative moderation between the selection of team managers with 606 
more accomplishments and the acquisition of new players (differently from Hypothesis 4). We 607 
suggest that the negative moderation is consistent with a hypothesis of conformity for both team 608 
managers and new players. Based on their past successes, team managers might be more likely to 609 
replicate their routines and tactics regarding the socialization of new players – as they expect to 610 
replicate victories. Their possible rigidity might clash with new players, while less established 611 
team managers are more flexible – and perhaps more exposed to the ‘star power’ of new players. 612 
On the other hand, new players respond to managers’ referent power by pre-empting any attempt 613 
to experiment with new ideas and behaviors and/or emulating managers as role models. The 614 
greater a manager’s referent power, the more employees (embedded in compliance 615 
culture/tactics) assume follower behaviors (Groves, 2005). Team managers’ referent power is 616 
arguably enforced in the context of strong socialization tactics (e.g. training camps) that 617 
centralize decision-making (e.g., players are asked to adhere to specific tactics and individual 618 
roles) and make clear separations between roles (Zhang, 2017). In such contexts, new players are 619 
located in a subordinate position and become less likely to think and act ‘outside of the box’. 620 
Noticeably, the moderation between the selection of team managers with more accomplishments 621 
and the acquisition of new players is (slightly) less negative for new players with short term 622 
contracts. This is consistent with Hypothesis 5, i.e. short-term newcomers who expect to leave 623 
soon are less likely to conform to the values and practices of the hiring organizations, and thus 624 
(slightly) more likely to act “outside of the box”. Yet, even for these new players, conformity to 625 
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top-down decisions seems to represent the rule. Indeed, in practice, hired players who do not 626 
adjust to the new organizations would just be benched. 627 
Implications for theory 628 
The field of professional sport competitions represents an ideal setting to observe behaviors and 629 
practices around the discovery, acquisition and deployment of new talents. Talents such as 630 
scientists, designers and experts are more than resources; they generate new opportunities for 631 
firms, which shape their ‘vision for the future’ around their human capital. Complementing 632 
theories explaining the strategic value of human capital through the resource-based view (Crook 633 
et al., 2011), we looked at the entrepreneurial opportunities linked with the discovery and 634 
deployment of new talents. 635 
Our first contribution relates to the theory of human capital in entrepreneurship (Marvel et al., 636 
2014; Unger et al., 2011). Earlier research considered the human capital of employees mostly 637 
from a strategic point of view, i.e. using the resource-based view to explain the link between the 638 
‘stock’ of human capital and performance. Differently, our study shows an important distinction 639 
between the “stock” and the “flow” of human capital – the former represented by the roster 640 
quality and thus the available pool of talents, while the latter by the discovery and introduction of 641 
new talents in the organization. Our model highlights that they provide distinct effects on firm 642 
survival and growth. The former provides the basis for competitive advantage (both strategically 643 
and tactically), while the latter provides the basis for venturing into new market niches. For 644 
example, while the roster quality might explain which team is more likely to win the 645 
competition, the discovery of new talents might explain why a mid-table team immediately 646 
becomes a contender. Our results confirm that the ‘short supply’ and ‘semi-permanent tenure’ of 647 
talents create a gulf with competitors and guarantee at the very least survival in the market (e.g. 648 
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high-status organizations such as Juventus FC, AC Milan and FC Inter do not even consider the 649 
chances of relegation). Our results provide instead a more cautious view about the success of 650 
entrepreneurial orientations focused on high innovation, proactiveness and competitive 651 
aggressiveness. We highlight how these do not translate into superior (or inferior) performances, 652 
as apparently the opportunities and risk of discovering/deploying new talents are softened by 653 
external conditions or internal practices. 654 
This connects to our second contribution, which relates to the literature on entrepreneurial 655 
orientation (Covin & Lumpkin, 2011; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Rosenbusch et al., 2013). Earlier 656 
studies have suggested that high innovation, proactiveness, risk-taking and competitive 657 
aggressiveness is related to superior performances (Rauch et al., 2009), although recent meta-658 
analyses are emphasizing that this link is context-dependent (Rosenbusch et al., 2011). In the 659 
specific context of professional sport entrepreneurship, our results are consistent with the latter 660 
argument, as the link between entrepreneurial orientation (measured by the discovery of new 661 
talents) and performance was non-significant. On the upside, this suggests that the discovery of 662 
“too many” talents does not have destabilizing effects, if organizations control for the level and 663 
size of the overall human capital. On the downside, organizations did not gain added value from 664 
the acquisition of new players – i.e. we found no evidence that a team with more discovery of 665 
new talents systematically outperformed others with comparable human capital. We suggested 666 
that socialization tactics might be one field-level explanation for this result. Every soccer 667 
organization adopts training camps and similar initiatives, meant to adjust newcomers, reduce 668 
internal conflicts, and align players to a common ‘vision of the future’. In doing so, socialization 669 
tactics generate the conformity of talents to the organization. So, organizations can safely look at 670 
the human capital of new players to increase their chances of winning, but their deployment does 671 
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not per se produce disruptive effects. The temporary acquisition of players might be an 672 
exception, as it could subtract value from firms, arguably because leaving expectations and 673 
different affiliations increase the separation of values, beliefs and interests among talents. 674 
Implications for practice 675 
The findings allow a broader discussion on the competition between big and established firms 676 
(e.g. Juventus FC, AC Milan, FC Inter) and young (e.g. newly promoted) and less established 677 
ones (e.g. Atalanta, Genoa), i.e. between wealthy and less affluent owners. Our findings 678 
highlight a scenario in which the former can use their greater economic power to gain a long-679 
term competitive advantage against the others, because they can invest in new human capital and 680 
fear limited negative repercussions. So, ‘rich’ organizations can (i) easily discover potential 681 
sources of competitive advantages (e.g. from constant match observations via advanced scouting 682 
systems); (ii) easily attract them (e.g. through the transfer market); and (iii) effectively exploit 683 
them (e.g. through socialization tactics and team management). As a result, entrepreneurs might 684 
just use their economic power to attract and retain their talents, and expect firm growth and 685 
survival. By contrast, the chances of long-term growth for younger, less rich, and less established 686 
teams is thwarted by their struggle to retain talents. The institutional properties of the field – i.e. 687 
high transparency of human capital opportunities as players’ skills are constantly visible and 688 
analyzed; fluid transfer market as organizations can easily attract skilled individuals with 689 
contracts and fees – are likely to generate barriers and opportunities for firm growth. On the one 690 
hand, established organizations (e.g. Juventus FC, Bayern Munich) have enjoyed continued 691 
success because of the strength of their ownership, and thus the capacity to attract and retain 692 
talents. On the other hand, organizations with new ownerships (e.g. Red Bull Leipzig, 693 
Manchester City and Chelsea) have seemingly enjoyed very rapid growth because money was 694 
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heavily invested in new players. Differently, other established and newly founded firms fail or 695 
live in a competitive ‘limbo’ as they lack the resources to retain talents. 696 
CONCLUSIONS 697 
Our study contributes to the debate on human capital in entrepreneurship studies. While previous 698 
research investigated the human capital of entrepreneurs, our study focused on the 699 
entrepreneurial orientation toward the discovery and deployment of new talents in the field of 700 
soccer organizations. Here, the discovery and exploitation of (players’) human capital is 701 
especially evident and transparent, as soccer organizations constantly innovate and take risks 702 
with the acquisition of new players. Our findings suggest differentiated effects of human capital 703 
stocks and flows on firms’ chances of survival, growth and success. This research cross-fertilizes 704 
concepts from strategy, organizational behavior and entrepreneurship studies to highlight the 705 
contributions of (i) greater stocks of human capital, which in conditions of short supply and 706 
semi-permanent tenure, can create a competitive gulf with others; (ii) greater flows of human 707 
capital, which may provide opportunities of ‘variety’ and risks of ‘separation’; and (iii) team 708 
managers with high-reputation, who may be appropriately equipped to deploy the talents of 709 
expert employees. 710 
We believe that these considerations extend to any sector characterized by: (i) a key role of 711 
expert workers in determining firm growth (e.g. consultants, scientists, lawyers, artists); (ii) 712 
relatively ‘easy’ discovery of talents, either because performances are tangible (e.g. patents) 713 
and/or public (e.g. lawsuits). Consultancy, entertainment and professional firms exemplify 714 
organizations constantly engaged in the discovery, acquisition and exploitation of new talents - 715 
not unlike soccer clubs. Our findings suggest that entrepreneurs in established as well as newly 716 
founded firms can grow and succeed over time, if they keep their human capital “stock” high. 717 
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We recognize that our study has limitations that future research could usefully address for theory 718 
development. First, our cross-sectional approach does not allow causal inferences. Future studies 719 
can implement alternative approaches (e.g., ethnographies, case studies and grounded theory) to 720 
advance knowledge in this regard. Second, we focus on a peculiar empirical setting. Related to 721 
Bauer et al. (2007), we suggest testing the discovery and exploitation of human capital in 722 
contexts characterized by different intensities and structures of socialization tactics, regulations, 723 
and performances – in order to further refine theory in this regard. Alternatively, future research 724 
could test our propositions on conformity and careerism through models that explicitly include 725 
their measures. Other mediating and moderating factors may also improve our theoretical 726 
contributions, most notably, team leadership characteristics of team managers (e.g., style). 727 
Finally, we suggest future research to expand analysis on the entrepreneurship behaviors in sport 728 
environments. We noted that earlier research has sometimes investigated the decision-making of 729 
team managers and players or, conversely, the institutional entrepreneurship of sport leagues 730 
(e.g. Wright & Zammuto, 2011). We remark again the need to expand these two research 731 
streams, as well as connect them through more extended analyses of the entrepreneurial behavior 732 
of sport organizations, e.g. how they discover and exploit opportunities related to the human, 733 
social and technological capital (e.g. Marino et al., 2016), and how sport-related and financial 734 
goals inform the decision-making of owners and top managers. 735 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix (n = 342) 
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. TableRanking -10.03 5.53 1.00              
2. NewPlayers 10.64 .42 -0.40*** 1.00             
3. LoanedPlayers 2.37 2.73 -0.37*** 0.58*** 1.00            
4. AcquiredPlayers 8.27 3.57 -0.21*** 0.79*** 0.04 1.00           
5. TeamManagerAccomplishments 2.28 3.97 -0.32*** 0.21*** 0.28*** 0.05 1.00          
6. OrganizationalReputation 4.03 7.00 -0.50*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.09† 0.30*** 1.00         
7. CulturalProximity 0.11 0.13 -0.14** 0.17** 0.15** 0.10† 0.05 0.15** 1.00        
8. OrganizationalProximity 1.41 0.71 -0.47*** 0.55*** 0.22*** 0.52*** 0.30*** 0.44*** 0.07 1.00       
9. RosterSize 31.58 4.57 -0.13* 0.41*** 0.37*** 0.23*** 0.02 0.11* 0.34*** 0.04 1.00      
10. RosterAge 25.54 1.26 -0.06 0.01 0.13* 0.09 0.03 0.21*** 0.01 0.24*** 0.11* 1.00     
11. RosterQuality 5.34 6.30 -0.53*** 0.17** 0.01 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.69*** 0.24*** 0.63*** -0.17** 0.41*** 1.00    
12. StadiumSeats 40,525 21,339 -0.55*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.13* 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.18** 0.46*** 0.10† 0.15** 0.55*** 1.00   
13. Penalization 0.026 0.16 -0.14** 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.10† 0.16** 0.09† 1.00  
14. NetTransfer 3.58 22.66 -0.27*** 0.03 0.14** 0.07 -0.31*** 0.34*** 0.05 0.14* 0.00 0.10† -0.23*** 0.31*** 0.04 1.00 
†p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
  
 
Table 2 
Regression models 
Standard errors reported in parentheses. †< 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
 
Dependent variable: TableRanking Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
NewPlayers 
 
-0.015* 
(0.007) 
-0.041* 
(0.020) 
 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
 
NewPlayers2 
  
0.001 
(0.001) 
   
LoanedPlayers 
   
-0.026** 
(0.009) 
 
-0.021* 
(0.010) 
AcquiredPlayers 
   
-0.008 
(0.008) 
 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
TeamManagerAccomplishments 
    
0.040** 
(0.016) 
0.040* 
(0.016) 
NewPlayers x 
TeamManagerAccomplishments 
    
-0.004** 
(0.001) 
 
LoanedPlayers x 
TeamManagerAccomplishments 
     
-0.009* 
(0.004) 
AcquiredPlayers x 
TeamManagerAccomplishments 
     
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
OrganizationalReputation 0.032*** 
(0.008) 
0.031*** 
(0.008) 
0.031*** 
(0.008) 
0.028*** 
(0.008) 
0.031*** 
(0.008) 
0.028*** 
(0.008) 
CulturalProximity -0.215 
(0.186) 
-0.257 
(0.187) 
-0.283 
(0.187) 
-0.254 
(0.185) 
-0.251 
(0.185) 
-0.257 
(0.183) 
OrganizationalProximity 0.054 
(0.050) 
-0.019 
(0.061) 
-0.026 
(0.061) 
0.004 
(0.062) 
-0.035 
(0.061) 
-0.013 
(0.061) 
RosterSize -0.033*** 
(0.005) 
-0.027*** 
(0.006) 
-0.028*** 
(0.006) 
-0.025*** 
(0.006) 
-0.026*** 
(0.006) 
-0.025*** 
(0.006) 
RosterAge  -0.050* 
(0.020) 
-0.042* 
(0.020) 
-0.043 
(0.020) 
-0.040* 
(0.020) 
-0.040* 
(0.020) 
-0.034† 
(0.020) 
RosterQuality 0.025** 
(0.008) 
0.028** 
(0.009) 
0.028** 
(0.009) 
0.031*** 
(0.009) 
0.026** 
(0.009) 
0.030*** 
(0.009) 
StadiumSeats 9.06e-6*** 
(0.000) 
8.44e-6*** 
(0.000) 
8.60e-6*** 
(0.000) 
7.81e-6*** 
(0.000) 
8.88e-6*** 
(0.000) 
8.37e-6*** 
(0.000) 
Penalization 0.260 
(0.171) 
0.271 
(0.170) 
0.284† 
(0.170) 
0.279 
(0.170) 
0.271 
(0.169) 
0.278† 
(0.168) 
NetTransfer -0.002† 
(0.001) 
-0.002† 
(0.001) 
-0.002† 
(0.001) 
-0.002† 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.002† 
(0.001) 
Log likelihood 
-919.45 -917.32 -916.31 -916.01 -913.50 -910.82 
Wald- χ2 
195.60 199.60 200.85 209.91 205.27 219.90 
Improvement over base model (χ2) 
- 4.00 5.25 14.31 9.67 24.30 
No. of Obs. 
342 342 342 342 342 342 
